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Mexico in Contemplation of NAFTA:




Rectonda del Estado, or the government's vested right to exercise
the stewardship of the economy, was enshrined as a constitutional law
principle on February 3, 1983, as a consequence of constitutional
amendments enacted during the administration of President Miguel
de la Madrid.I The process that led to this presidential initiative,
however, commenced in 1910, when the thrust of the Mexican
Revolution shifted from the democratization of the electoral process
2
to the promotion of government control over natural resources.
3
Most of the Revolution's goals were achieved with the passage of the
1917 Constitution,4 which imposed the first set of restrictions on for-
eign investment and claimed direct government ownership over land,
waters, petroleum, and other subsurface mineral deposits. 5 The Con-
stitution also has a high social content, reflecting revolutionary ideals
that were transformed into a paternalistic protection of the poor and
of the legitimate aspirations of the less privileged social classes. 6
More than fifty years of virtually unopposed political leadership
t "NAFTA" is the North American Free Trade Agreement. Rectoria del Estado is a
Mexican constitutional law principle which preserves the executive branch's right to exercise
the "stewardship of the economy" to insure, among other things, "an integral economic
development that will reinforce democracy and the national sovereignty."
* Licenciado en Derecho, Universidad Nacional Aut6noma de M6xico; J.D., Univer-
sity of Houston, 1971. Partner, Camil Abogados, Mexico City.
1. CONsTrTUc10N POLiTICA DE Los ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS [Constitution] arts.
25, 26 (Mex.) [hereinafter CONST.].
2. The original goal of the 1910 Mexican Revolution was to oust Porfirio Diaz, one of
the longest reigning dictators in modem times, and to democratize the electoral process. This
revolutionary aspiration is still present today in the motto that precedes the signature of every
official communication by Mexican public officers: "Effective Suffrage; No Reelection."
3. CONST. art. 27. See Jorge Camil, Mexico's 1989 Foreign Investment Regulations: The
Cornerstone of a New Economic Model, 12 Hous. J. INT'L L. 1, 5-7 (1989).
4. CONST. art. 25.
5. CONST. art. 27, paras. 1, 4.
6. The Constitution contains, for instance, provisions governing: (a) general principles
of labor law; (b) land holdings by rural communities (ejidos); (c) protection of public health;
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gave the governments that followed the Revolution an apparent birth-
right to rule the economy in accordance with prevailing administra-
tive policy. Gradually, but persistently, Mexican political administra-
tions claimed a larger role in the economic process.
This Article presents an overview of the concept of Rectora del
Estado, from the enactment of the 1917 Constitution until the current
administration of President Salinas de Gortari. The Article reviews
the oil expropriation of 1938, the Mexican economic "miracle" of
1940-1970, the fiscal and economic crisis of 1970-1982, and the bank
nationalization of 1982, in light of the corresponding administrations'
willingness to intervene in Mexico's economic life through either reg-
ulation or the promotion of legislation. Finally, this Article addresses
the modern concept of Rectoria del Estado, as it is exercised by the
administration of President Salinas de Gortari. This Article con-
cludes that the current administration is more interested in restoring
economic growth than in claiming a stronger political and economic
foothold through excessive government regulation, protectionism, and
exacerbated nationalism.
II. THE 1938 OIL EXPROPRIATION AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF
A "REVOLUTIONARY" NATIONALISM: RECTORfA DEL
ESTADO AT AN ALL-TIME HIGH
The 1938 oil expropriation was, without a doubt, the first United
States encounter with the exercise of Rector'a del Estado. Claiming
the preservation of Mexico's oil industry, apparently threatened by
the failure of the foreign-owned oil companies to comply with a Mexi-
can Supreme Court ruling on a national labor conflict,7 President
Lizaro Cirdenas expropriated the assets of the foreign companies in-
volved in the Mexican oil industry. The exercise of this constitutional
right by the first institutional political administration after the
Revolution8 was, in the opinion of authorized sources, 9 an aggravat-
ing factor that some believed at the time could have caused a military
and (d) the right to "dignified and decent housing." These provisions do not represent consti-
tutional rights per se, but are rather a basis for further legislative or political action.
7. Decreto que expropia a favor del patrimonio de la nacidn, los bienes muebles e in-
muebles pertenecientes a las compafias petroleras que se negaron a acatar el laudo del 18 de
diciembre de 1937, del Grupo Ndmero 7 de la Junta Federal de Conciliacidn y Arbitraje, Diario
Oficial [D.O.] Mar. 19, 1938 (statement of purposes).
8. Lfizaro Cirdenas was the first president after the Revolution to comply with the cur-
rent constitutional six-year presidential term.
9. See generally EDUARDO SUAREZ, COMENTARIOS Y RECUERDOS (1977). In the opin-
ion of Mr. Eduardo Suirez, Treasury Secretary during the expropriation, President Cirdenas
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intervention by the United States.10
The success of the oil expropriation, coupled with the birth of a
strong domestic oil industry, gave President Cirdenas, and the subse-
quent administrations, a sense of economic and political pride. This
pride has been accurately described as "revolutionary nationalism,"
because such a bold political decision: (a) reduced Mexico's foreign
economic dependence; (b) consolidated the constitution's aspirations
to have strong government control over natural resources;" (c) gave
Mexico a position of leadership in Latin America; and (d) allowed
Mexico to start building a strong industrial base.
III. THE MEXICAN ECONOMIC "MIRACLE": DEVELOPMENT
WITH PRICE AND MONETARY STABILITY
Mexico faced the post-World War II era with considerable for-
eign exchange reserves, due to the suspension of imports during the
conflict. The resulting economic boom was substantially fueled by an
economic model which promoted: (a) the birth of a strong Mexican
industry; (b) "import substitution;"' 12 (c) "industrial integration;"'
13
and (d) development with price and monetary stability.' 4 For all its
protectionist measures on foreign trade, however, the Desarrollo Es-
tabilizador i5 was an economic model that allowed for minimal gov-
was concerned about the effects of the expropriation and feared an act of force on the part of
the United States.
10. Id. Mr. Eduardo Suirez, also fearful of United States military intervention, con-
vinced President Cirdenas to send a letter to the United States government through the offices
of the Mexican ambassador, Mr. Castillo Nijera. Apparently, the President was ready to re-
sign rather than risk being the cause of a military conflict between Mexico and the United
States.
11. See generally Camil, supra note 3.
12. The policy of "import replacement" was designed to induce local manufacturers to
change from "the establishment of plans for the mere assembly or final processing of imported
parts or intermediate products," into real manufacturing facilities. HENRY K. WRIGHT, FOR-
EIGN ENTERPRISE IN MEXICO 84 (1971).
13. "Industrial integration" is a term "applied in Mexico to the domestic production of a
commodity from domestic raw materials and intermediate products and other Mexican-source
supplies." Id. at 170.
14. This economic model was predicated on the basis that the government would main-
tain strict price controls and a fixed foreign exchange rate by committing the Central Bank to
exchange unlimited amounts of pesos and dollars at a fixed rate of exchange. This caused great
confidence in both Mexican and foreign investors by allowing them to calculate, with a great
degree of certainty, the foreign exchange rate factor into their investment equation.
15. A more developed version of this economic model is attributed to Mr. Antonio Ortiz
Mena, former Secretary of the Treasury under two Mexican presidents, and former Chairman
of the Interamerican Development Bank.
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ernment intervention in domestic economic matters; a sort of laissez
faire a la mexicana.
This period of Mexican economic history spanned almost three
decades, between 1945 to 1970, and resulted, among other economic
benefits, 16 in the largest flow of direct foreign investment. "The grow-
ing restrictions on foreign capital did not deter foreign investors from
participating in the Mexican industrial boom[.] Fully protected by
tariffs, and stimulated by federal tax concessions and other incentives,
foreign investors thrived in the Mexican market."
17
The critics of Desarrollo Estabilizador allege that this economic
model resulted in: (a) an inefficient and costly Mexican industry that
relied too much on protectionism and government subsidies; (b) a
cheap Mexican peso that caused excessive consumer spending and
capital flight; and (c) social neglect to the detriment of the lower
classes. 18
IV. THE POLITICAL PENDULUM SWINGS TO THE LEFT:
DEVELOPMENT WITH EQUITABLE INCOME
DISTRIBUTION
The second foreign encounter with the Mexican concept of Rec-
toria del Estado came with the passage of the Foreign Investment Law
in 1973.19 As a consequence of this legislation, foreign investors were
generally precluded from acquiring a controlling interest in Mexican
corporations for almost fifteen years following its enactment. "In a
major departure from long-standing government policy, the
[Echeverria] administration abandoned the economic model based on
development with price and monetary stability and embarked on a
new policy that emphasized a more equitable income distribution. '20
The Echeverria administration was engaged, almost from the be-
16. Other recognized benefits of Desarrollo Estabilizador were: (a) political stability;
(b) the consolidation of a large Mexican industrial base; (c) sustained rates of growth of ap-
proximately 6% per annum; and (d) very low inflation rates.
17. Camil, supra note 3, at 7-8.
18. See generally ROGER D. HANSEN, THE POLITICS OF MEXICAN DEVELOPMENT
(1974). President Salinas recently became one of the stern critics of Desarrollo Establiizador.
See infra note 42 and accompanying text.
19. Ley para Promover la Inversidn Mexicana y Regular la Inversidn Extranjera, D.O.
Mar. 9, 1973 [hereinafter F.I.L.]. The F.I.L. was passed amidst considerable debate by the
investment community and allegations by the United States ambassador that Mexico was
changing the "rules of the game." CARLOS TELLO, LA POLITICA ECON6MICA EN MftxICO 58
(4th ed. 1980).
20. Camil, supra note 3, at 8.
[Vol. 15:761
Contemplation of NAFTA
ginning, in a frenzy of legislative and regulatory activities apparently
aimed at creating an environment in which the new economic benefits
could be shared by all Mexican citizens. Consequently, "the govern-
ment expanded its areas of endeavor, subsidized the price of its goods
and services, and evoked the same kind of nationalism that spurred
economic growth in the 1940s.
' ' 21
V. THE NATIONALIZATION OF THE BANKING SYSTEM:
CARDENAS REVISITED?
The fiscal deficit that started during the Echeverria administra-
tion22 was considerably intensified during the subsequent administra-
tion of President Jos6 L6pez Portillo.23 Relying on the newly
discovered oil, as well as on the excessive liquidity of the international
money markets, in 1976 the L6pez Portillo administration com-
menced a borrowing spree that would increase the foreign debt almost
five times over the following six years. 24 Mexico became one of the
world's largest debtors amidst economic confusion caused by: (a) the
substantial fall in the international oil prices; (b) the ninety billion
dollar external debt; (c) the devaluation of the Mexican peso; (d) the
nationalization of commercial banks; (e) the mandatory conversion of
all domestic dollar deposits into pesos; and (f) the imposition of for-
eign exchange controls for the first time in modern Mexico.
25
The President's decision to nationalize the commercial banks was
an extreme exercise of Rectoria del Estado that polarized domestic
public opinion, alienated the domestic investment community, and
brought to an abrupt end a dream of economic wealth 26 based on a
volatile commodity27 and an unrealistic growth financed with bor-
21. Id. at 9.
22. The Echeverria administration increased the level of external debt by five times in six
years to a total of $20 billion. Moreover, this administration created a welfare state based on
government growth, subsidized goods and services, and foreign debt. See generally ROSARIO
GREEN, ESTADO Y BANCA TRANSNACIONAL EN MIxico (1981).
23. Official figures estimated the 1982 aggregate public and private external debt at the
end of the L6pez Portillo administration at $87.6 billion. See TIMOTHY HEYMAN, INVESTING
IN MEXICO 8 (1989).
24. Id.
25. See Camil, supra note 3, at 12.
26. Considering Mexico's vast oil reserves, President L6pez Portillo, early in his adminis-
tration, warned the Mexican people that they should be prepared to administer their newly-
found wealth.
27. The price of Mexican oil fell from $38.50 per barrel in 1981 to $12 per barrel in 1985
and 1986. HEYMAN, supra note 23, at 31.
1993]
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rowed funds.2s
In the euphoria following the bank nationalization, the official
rhetoric made an early attempt to compare President L6pez Portillo's
decision with La'zaro Ca'rdenas's historic expropriation. The substan-
tial differences, however, became apparent almost immediately. The
bank nationalization did not affect the interests of the foreign invest-
ment community, but did affect Mexican investors holding a control-
ling interest in the banks. In fact, the nationalization came somehow
as a blessing for the international banking community with substan-
tial exposure in Mexico's commercial banks. One of the immediate
legal results of the nationalization was that the government became
responsible for the nationalized institutions' foreign debt. Moreover,
the bank nationalization and the simultaneous imposition of foreign
exchange controls 29 were never included in the political platform of
the President's own party. They had been a part of the political plat-
form of the leftist parties that obtained, due to President L6pez Por-
tillo's surprising actions, two of their most important goals. In
addition, the bank nationalization was not a political exercise of sov-
ereignty to protect the Mexican soil from foreign economic interven-
tion, but, rather, an internal political action that brought to a head-on
collision what some regarded as a long-lasting dispute between the
public and the private sectors for the control of the Mexican nation.30
VI. RECTORfA DEL ESTADO Is ENSHRINED IN THE
MEXICAN CONSTITUTION
President Miguel de la Madrid, a former constitutional law pro-
fessor, made his imprint in the Mexican legal system by submitting a
congressional initiative to amend the Constitution and include a chap-
ter on economic law.3' The amendments resulted in the principle of
Rectora del Estado and suggested a considerable increase in the pow-
ers of the executive branch to:
... insure an integral economic development that will reinforce
democracy and the national sovereignty, while promoting growth,
employment, and a more equitable income distribution in order to
allow the exercise of freedom and dignity of all individuals, groups
28. See HEYMAN, supra note 23 and accompanying text.
29. Decreto que establece el control generalizado de cambios, D.O. Sept. 1, 1982.
30. See generally ROLANDO CORDERA & CARLOS TELLO, MIexico: LA DISPUTA POR
LA NACI6N (2d ed. 1981). Mr. Tello was appointed by President L6pez Portillo as head of the
Central Bank in charge of implementing and supervising the bank nationalization.
31. CoNsr. arts. 25, 26.
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and social classes protected by the Constitution.32
The amendments also explicitly recognized the federal govern-
ment's responsibility for central planning of the economy and for the
execution of development plans. 33 There was considerable unrest
among certain opposition parties and the business community, be-
cause the amendments suggested a large increase in the powers of the
executive branch to intervene in all aspects of the economy.
VII. MEXIco's ENTRY INTO GATT AND THE 1984 FOREIGN
INVESTMENT GUIDELINES: A TREND REVERSAL
TOWARDS A FREE MARKET ECONOMY
Notwithstanding the Rectoria del Estado constitutional amend-
ments, which suggested an ever-increasing government intervention
on economic matters, President de la Madrid "who governed Mexico
from 1982 until 1988, [was] largely responsible for the initial thrust to
modernize Mexico's economy through the liberalization of foreign
trade."' 34 Prompted by Mexico's triple digit inflation and a dramatic
economic crisis, the de la Madrid administration made an initial effort
to liberalize the foreign investment legislation, 35 restructured Mex-
ico's large external debt,36 and decided to join GATT. 37 President de
la Madrid also curbed the apparently uncontrollable inflation by exer-
cising administrative initiative. As a result, the government, the un-
ions, and the private sector signed an "Economic Solidarity Pact" to
control wages, prices, import duties, and the rate of exchange. 38
VIII. THE SALINAS ADMINISTRATION: A NEW STYLE OF
RECTORIA DEL ESTADO IN CONTEMPLATION OF NAFTA
In the light of current events, a superficial observer of Mexico's
political process could be tempted to conclude that in the Mexico of
Carlos Salinas de Gortari, the executive branch is about to abdicate
the stewardship of the Mexican economy. The current administration
32. CONST. art. 25, para. 1.
33. CONST. art. 26.
34. Camil, supra note 3, at 12.
35. See generally Sandra F. Maviglia, Mexico's Guidelines for Foreign Investment. The
Selective Promotion of Necessary Industries, 80 AM. J. INT'L. L. 281 (1986).
36. President de la Madrid made "successive debt renegotiations in each year [during his
six-year term of office]." HEYMAN, supra note 23, at 4.
37. For a thorough analysis of the circumstances surrounding Mexico's entry into
GATT, see generally Luis MALPICA DE LA MADRID, QOE Es EL GATT? (1st rev. ed. 1988).
38. See Camil, supra note 3, at 5 nn. 27-29.
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has undertaken to: (a) privatize steel, airlines, telephone services, cop-
per mines, and many other smaller, but equally inefficient, industries;
(b) reverse the bank nationalization, in order to privatize Mexico's
eighteen commercial banks; (c) pass new foreign investment regula-
tions39 that considerably facilitate the acceptance of majority foreign
capital in Mexican corporations; (d) prosecute corrupt labor leaders4°
in unions that were once considered the life-line of the Mexican polit-
ical system; (e) implement additional deregulation in transportation,
telecommunications, petrochemicals, technology transfer, and truck
manufacturing; and (f) enact financial legislation that accepts, for the
first time in modem times, foreign equity participation in banking,
brokerage houses, factoring companies, bonding institutions, and leas-
ing enterprises. 4' In light of the above mentioned actions, it would
certainly appear as if the strong Mexican presidential system were in
the process of being dismantled, ending the concept of Rectoria del
Estado less than ten years after it was enshrined as a principle of Mex-
ican constitutional law.
The truth, however, is that the Mexican presidency is alive and
well and stronger than ever. Deregulation, privatization, and liberali-
zation are but a part of Mexico's modernization process to meet the
challenge of the 1990s. In the words of President Salinas, Mexico "is
proud of its past, but has its eyes on the future. ' 42 Since his inaugura-
tion, President Salinas has been committed to reducing the size of the
federal government and has favored massive privatization. This dra-
matic change in policy, however, has not been prompted by a desire to
give away presidential power but, rather, seeks to avoid using public
funds to subsidize inefficient government companies. 43 "The archaic
concept of an all encompassing federal government is being substi-
tuted with a new vision of a modern, more efficient state. The eco-
39. Reglamento de la Ley para Promover la Inversidn Mexicana y Regular la Inversin
Extranjera, D.O. May 16, 1989. For a discussion of the implications and importance of these
regulations in the Mexican legal system, see Camil, supra note 3.
40. In the beginning days of his administration, President Salinas courageously decided
to prosecute Mr. Joaquin Hernndez Galicia, a.k.a. "La Quina," the all-powerful national
leader of the oil workers union.
41. See amendments to Ley General de Organizaciones y Actividades Auxiliares del Cr-
dito and amendments to Ley Federal de Instituciones de Fianzas, D.O. Jan. 3, 1990. See also
amendments to Ley del Mercado de Valores, Ley de Instituciones de Cridito, and Ley para
Regular las Agrupaciones Financieras, D.O. July 18, 1990.
42. President Carlos Salinas de Gortari, Address at the Business Round Table (June 11,
1990), in SECRETARIA DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES, TEXTOS DE POLITICA EXTERIOR 39
(1990) [hereinafter Salinas Address].
43. See Camil, supra note 3, at n. 174 and accompanying text.
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nomic model adopted by the new administration is predicated upon a
federal government concerned with national priorities and not en-
gaged in commercial competition with the private sector.""
The president recently recognized that the Desarrollo Es-
tabilizador,45 the economic model that followed World War II, was
largely responsible for the fiscal deficit that resulted in Mexico's se-
vere economic crisis in the 1980s.46 Considering Mexico's great social
and economic needs, President Salinas concluded recently that "mod-
ernization has ceased to be an option, in order to become an
imperative." 47
Stimulated by the opportunities offered by a North American
market, and pressed to expand the democratization of the electoral
process, Mexico faces the North American Free Trade Agreement
("NAFTA") with a clear commitment to pursue, among other priori-
ties, the following: (a) the renewal of close ties with the United States;
(b) the support and promotion of domestic and foreign private invest-
ment; (c) the increase in the level of drug enforcement; (d) the im-
provement in its record on human rights; and (e) the promotion of
stronger environmental protection regulations.
Modernization, however, does not mean a loss of sovereignty.
As Mexico's Foreign Secretary has indicated, Mexicans today are
watching the most recent events in their country with surprise, but
also with enthusiasm. They are willing to assume the responsibilities
of the challenge but, above all, they want to continue being
Mexicans. 48
IX. CONCLUSION
The term Rectoria del Estado may have been coined by the con-
stitutional amendments initiated by President Miguel de la Madrid,
but the concept has been in evolution for the better part of this cen-
tury as a consequence of an ever-growing intervention exercised by
the post-Revolution governments. Virtually unopposed political lead-
ership allowed Mexican presidents to build a strong executive branch
that has, to a certain extent, permeated the judicial and legislative
44. See id. at 20.
45. See Salinas Address, supra note 42, at 4-5.
46. See id.
47. See id. at 5.
48. Fernando Solana (Mexican Foreign Secretary), Address at the celebration of the
180th anniversary of Mexico's Independence (Sept. 16, 1990), in SECRETARIA DE RELA-
CLONES EXTERIORES, TEXTOS DE POLITICA EXTERIOR 49 (1990).
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branches. Over the past sixty years, Mexican presidents have taken
the economy from a revolutionary nationalism to the threshold of
NAFTA. The sometimes drastic changes in economic policy have
often depended upon the status of the economy, the balance of pay-
ments, or the prevailing political sentiment towards foreign invest-
ment, and have prompted critics to allege that Mexico is a country
which is "reinvented" every six years at the beginning of every polit-
ical administration. Based on this somewhat unfair allegation, many
are concerned about the future of Mexico after Carlos Salinas de
Gortari. Will the political pendulum swing back towards a centrally
planned economy, strong government intervention, protectionism,
and restrictions on foreign trade? This is highly unlikely. The com-
mitments made by President Salinas appear to be irreversible. Under
his leadership Mexico has taken the route of modernization because,
in the president's own words, "there is no other option." Moreover, if
Mexico becomes a part of NAFTA, one of the largest markets in the
world, the commitments assumed with the other two participants are
not likely to be repudiated by a country that has an impeccable record
of fulfilling its international obligations. Although Rectoria del Es-
tado may be exercised in the future to fine-tune the Mexican economy
in the area of foreign trade, the commitments assumed today will
more than likely continue to be honored because they are a part of a
modernization process that appears to be, finally, a reality.
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